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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UT AH PARKS COMP ANY, a corporation,
Petitioner,
-vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UT AH
and DONALD HACKING, HAL S. BENNETT and D. F. WILKINS, Commissioners
of the Public Service Commission of Utah,
and KENT FROST CANYONLAND TOURS,
a corporation,
Respondents.
l\UTCHELL M. WILLIAMS, dba TAG-ALONG TOURS,
Petitioner,
-vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UT AH
and DONALD HACKING, HAL S. BENNETT and D. F. WILKINS, Commissioners
of the Public Service Commission of Utah,
and KENT FROST CANYONLAND TOURS,
a corporation,
Respondents.

Case No.
10635

j

Case No.
10636

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a report and order of the
Puhlic Service Commission. The appeal challenges the
prnvisions of the order which eliminate restrictions regarding the pickup and discharge of passengers from
the certificate of a wilderness tour operator.
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DISPOSITION BY THE PUBLIC HJ<JR\'ICJ1~
COMMISSION OF UTAH
Applicants, Kent and Fern Frost, herein called tlw
Frosts applied to the Public Service Commission for
approval to the transfer o.f their existing operating rights
to a family corporation. The application also sought
extension of the certificate to include additional counties
and to eliminate restrictions in the existing certificate
so that the Frosts could pick up and discharge passengers at any place within the counties they were authorized to serve.
The Public Service Commission approved the transfer; denied the application to extend the certificate to
include additional counties, and granted the application
to originate and terminate tours at all points and places
within the counties they were originally authorized to
serve with the exception that the Frosts are not permitted to provide transportation from point to point
along the highways and further that Frosts may not
originate tours at Cedar City or Panguitch and may not
maintain a base of operations at or near :Mexican Hat
or Bluff ( R.. 191).

R.ELIEF SOUGHT ON APP:BJAL
Petitioners seek reversal of the order of the Public·
Service Commission insofar as it eliminates restrictioru1
from the Fro.sts' certificate.

3
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kent Frost has been a tourist guide in the wilderrn~ss areas of southern Utah since 1938 and has conducted his own tours in that area since 1953 (R. 14, 15).
He has been certified by the Public Service Commission
since 1956 (R. 15). Kent's wife, Fern, has worked with
her husband over the years as a driver, guide and in
the management of the family business. Mr. and Mrs.
Frost incorporated their business in 1965.
Tlw certificate of the Frosts' as it read before the
order from which this appeal has been taken, authorized
them to transport passangers and their baggage for charter and sight-seeing purposes off the main highways in
the counties of Grand, San Juan, Wayne, Garfield, Kane,
Iron, Washington and Emery. The certificate, however,
required that tours originate and terminate either at the
towns of Monticello, Blanding, Moab, Thompson, Green
River or from Cave Springs o·r Squaw Springs (which
are located in the Needles area of San Juan County).
The business of the scenic tour operator is vastly
different in nature from that of the transportation company usually identified with the term "common carrier."
First, the scenic tour operator draws from a prospective
clientele of vacationers, sight-seers and adventurers located throughout the world. The demand for the service
is limited only by the operators' imagination, ingenuity,
industry, and personal ability to interest and bring others
into the area. The conventional carrier is confronted with
Uw fact that there is but a limited demand for trans-
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portation o.f pa~sc•ng1Ts or prn1wrty from mw point tc 1
another solely for transportation's sakP.
Secondly, the service provided by Pach earner 1:-;
unique because the primary f ea tu re of tlw servicP i:-;
personal guide service. Thus, each such hu~iness op<·ration has its own personality and appeal, de1wnding upon
the background and experience of the guidP. One h111id<·
may place emphasis on local history and another gPOlof.,ry
or Indian lore. Cooking, services, equipment and a myriad of other factors tend to further distinguish each small
operator from the others. In addition, Pach guide ha:-;
his own favorite scenic areas. Thus, tlw client may well
desire to take the same trip in the same geographical
area but with another tour operator, for in one trip the
client may learn to see and appreciate the geologic
wonders of the area and yet in another lParn to seP
and appreciate an entirely different facet such as Indian
lore or local history. These distinctions are important
because they indicate that the tour operators compete
with each other only in a very limited sense and in fact
it might be said that each compliments the business of
the other in the accomplishment of his endeavors to bring
tourists into the scenic areas.
Frosts develop their clientele principally through
their own advertising and promotion efforts. Brochun·s
depicting their service are printed by the thousands and
distributed world \\ide (R. 16). The advertising approach as well as the tour guide se1Tice is highly personal and distinctive (R. 19, ..f.S). 15'~ of Frosts trade
is encrenered
lff
their own efforts as opposed to rderral
b
•
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husim•ss (R. 17). .M ueh of tlwir trade if' referred by
pn•vious satisfied customers (R. G6). Furthermon.. , 95%
of tlwir tours are on a prearrangf'd basis (R. 18) and
~:"(l of tlw business is repeat or return business (R. 18).
tours conducted by the Frosts involve travel
to th<' vast areas of scenic interest which are lo<?-ated off
of the main highways in southern and southeastern Utah.
Frnsts operate only 4-wheel drive or other high traction
n~hides designed to negotiate wildernt>ss terrain unsuited to vehicles generally engaged in the commercial
transportation of passangers. Public highways are used
onl.v as nt>cessary to reach the scenic wilderness areas.
~cenic

'l'he Frosts have arrangements with certain air and
water tourist services for combination land, water and
air tours in order to promote increased tourist trade into
:-:cPnic ·wilderness areas and to satisfy an obvious tourist
need therefor (R. 23, 25). Air taxies serve many small
towns in the scenic areas involved (R. 28). In addition,
nmnProus airstrips exist which, although originally cond rncted by uranium and oil prospectors, are available
to privatf' aircraft and air taxis in order to make quickly
aecessihle to tourists some of the most scenic parts of
tlw ean~·onlands country (R 30).
The recent development of Lake Powell is marked
Ji:, thP establishment of several marinas providing plea:-:nre ho a ting and tourist excursions (R. 19, 20). In addition to the marinas, the topography of several locations
along the lake shore is such as to permit four-wheel drive
vt>hicles to transfer to or pick up passengers or their
hagg-age from ·watercraft (R. 23).
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Kent Frost testified as to specific requests of hi1;
clientele which could not be served because of the restrictions in his certificate (R. 80, 91, 92) and that there
had been considerable interest with his clientele for th<:
combination tyiw tour (R. 35).
In order for wilderness sightseeing operators such
as the Frosts to effectively promote trade and provide
flexible service to new and repeat customers, a general
need has been manifest among such operators to take
advantage of the air and water services and facilities
by promoting combination scenic tours. Standing in ,the
way of the combination tour were the restrictions which
were written into most of the carriers' certificates.
These restrictions strictly limited the points of origin
and termination of tours. Prior to the hearing on the application of the Frosts, three tour operators operating
the same type service separately applied to the Commission for removal of restrictions from their certificates.
Petitioner, l\fitchell M. Williams dba rrag-A-Long
Tours appeared before the Commission in October, 1965.
The Commission amended Williams' certificate by removing the pickup and discharge restrictions thereby permitting Williams to pick up and discharge passengers and
their baggage at most any point in the wilderness areas
of Grand, San Juan, \Vayne, Emery, Garfield and Kane
Counties, tUah. The Frosts are authorized to operate in
all of these eounties under their restricted certificate
(Case No. 5436 - Sub 2, See R. 157). James E. and
Emery R. Hunt, dba Canyon County Scenic Tours, Eugene D. Foushee, dba Tours of the Big Country, Canyon-
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Inc. and Lake Powell Ferry Service all appeared
intervenors in support of 'Villiarns.

Pt~rs,
aR

Eugene D. Foushee dba Tour8 of the Big Country
al~o appeared before the Commission in October, 1965.
By order of the Commission dated December 17, 1965,
Foushee's certificate was amended by removing the pickup and discharge restrictions. Canyon Country Scenic
'l1ours, Inc., Mitchell M. Williams, dba Tag-A-Long
1,ours, and Canyoneers, Inc., all appeared as intervenors
in support of Foushee. The Frosts appeared as protestants but withdrew their protests after hearing the evidence (Case No. 5098 - Sub 1. See R. 152).
James E. and Emery R. Hunt dba Canyon Country
Sc•~nic Tours, a partnership, and Canyon Country Scenic
Tours, Inc. appeared at a consolidated hearing with
Williams and Foushee. The Hunt's certificate was also
amended to eliminate the same restrictions which the
Commission has eliminated from the Frost's certificate
in the case at bar.
In the case at bar the application of the Frosts for
removal of restrictions from their certificate was heard
hy the Commission on February 16, 1966. The commission's order granted the same relief as had been granted
the operators in the three previous hearings.
While all four of the appli~ations discussed supra
permit pick-up and discharge of passengers and their
baggage at any point within the counties respectively
authorized to the various carriers, their certificates re-
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main restricted in that no eaniPr may bas<~ its 01wration~
at the bat>e of anotht>r rarrier although toun-; of othPr
carriers may originate at the ha:::;e of anotlwr on a prearranged basis.
ARGP~n~NT

POINT I
THE ORDJ£R OF 'rHE PrBLIC SERVlCJ<:
COM~flSSION IS 'VITHlN YPS .Jl'Rl8DICTION; IS FOUNDED PPON A SOLTND LEGA!L BA8IS AND IS :NOT ARBI'THARY OR
CAPRICIOlJS.
rrhe Motor Vehicle Transportation Aet grantH broad
powers to the Public Service Commission to grant certificates to motor carriers in the furtherance of "publil'
convenience and necessity'' and also directs that a cPrtificate "shall not" issue if the Commission finds "that
the applicant is financially unable to properly perform
the services sought under the certificate, or that tlw
highway over which he proposes to operate is already
sufficiently burdened with traffic, or that the grantin~
of the certificate applied for will he detrimental to th<'
best interests of the people of the State o.f Utal1" ( 54-G-5
UCA 1953). rrhere is no contention made in this casP
that the Frosts are not financially able to perform th<>
service or that the highways are overburdened or that
the elimination of the restrictions from the Frosts' certificate will be detrimental to the best interests of thP
public. The contrary is the case here.
The sole issue presented by the yari ous arg·uments
of the pl'titioners is whether or not the Public SPrvicP
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Cmumission acted rPasonably and within its jurisdiction.
l :nder the statute the Commission has authority to grant
a eertificate if it finds that "the public convenience and
1wcessity require the proposed servict• or any part thereof" ( 54-6-5 PCA 195:3). The tt~rms "necPssity" and "convenience" are defined as follows in Mulcahy vs. Public
Seri: ice Commission rt al, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298:
(101 Utah 2-15, 250-251
"'Neeessity' and 'eonvenieneP' are not to be constnwd as synonymous. ConYPniPnce is much
broader and more inclusive than necessity, but
effect must be given to both. Xecessity means
reasonably necessary and not absolutely imperative. * * * (Cases cited). It does not mean 'necessary' in the ordinary sense of the term. The conVt>niPnce of the public must not be circumscribed
hy holding the term 'necessity' to mean an essential requisite. It uwans a public need without
\rhich the publir, people generally of the community, would be inconvenienced or handicapped
in the pursuit of business or wholesome pleasure,
or both. It is necessary if it appears reasonably
requisite, is suited to and tends to promote the
accommodation of the public. (Cases cited).* * *
The statute should be so construed and applied
... to look to the future as well as the present,
providing not only for presPnt urgent need, but
such as may be reasonably anticipated from the
probable growth of population, industry and communitv deYelopment to the end that ho.th the qua.1ity an'd quantity of that which is offered to the
public for its necessity, convenience and pleas~re
may he improved and increased, and couunurnty
dP~elopment and life enriched and encouraged."
The Commission is therefore charged with the responsibility to defonnine eomTenience and nPcessit~· in light
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of what is "reasonably necessary'' to promote tlu~ public
convenience and to eliminate "handicaps" or to "accommodate" the public 1n the "pursuit of business or wholesome pleasure or both." In doing so the Commission
should consider not only present but also future need
which is "reasonably to be anticipated.''
It should be kept in mind that the controlling considerations deal with public need and convenience and
not the convenience or needs of other carriers. In Ashworth Transfer Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 2
Utah 2d 23, 268 P.2d 990, protesting carriers contended
tl1at present transportation services were adequate and
that the Commission therefore had no jurisdiction to
grant additional authority. In considering this point the
court said: (2 Utah 2d 23, 30)

"The 'convenience' and 'necessity' to be eonsidered is that of the public ... and the statute does
not require that the commission find that th('
present facilities are entirely inadequate. It merely requires that the commission 'shall take into
consideration ... the existing transportation facilities';''
Williams principal attack upon the order in the
ease at bar is that "there is no finding of convenienc(:'
and necessity ... as is required by Title 54" CWilliams
Brief Page 9). It is apparently the eontention of counsel for Williams that the order may not stand, sinee there
is no single paragraph in the findings which categorically
uses the words "convenience and necessity." The words
themseves are conclusions to be drawn from evidentiary
findings and there are ample findings to support the
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ultimate conclusion of the Commission that the certificate should be enlarged by eliminating the pickup and
discharge restrictions.
In Utah Light and Traction Company vs. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 a protesting carrier also attacked the verbal precision of the
Conunission 's findings as a basis for reversal. In dealing with this issue, the Supreme Court said: (101 Utah
99, 106)
"These findings are not set forth in the detail
and particularity used by courts of law whose
judgments determine ultimate rights of life and
property, title, nor need they be so definite nor
orderly."
In the case at bar the findings of the Commission recited the evidence to the effect that the clientele of the
Frosts are principally customers who want the personalized services of the Frosts; that the Frosts' clientele
have made numerous requests for service which require
origination and termination at various points other than
those authorized in their present certificate; that the
character of the tour business has changed since the
Frosts and others were first authorized to serve; that
the certificates o.f the other principal tour operators
hased near the Frosts have been amended to eliminate
pickup and discharge restrictions; that the Frosts desire
to avail themselves of the need and potential for combination tours with other carriers to include transportation by air and water; and that there arc numerous
potential points of pickup and discharge of passengers
at airstrips and ho.at launching sites within the areas
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the Fro~t:::: are authorized to opr·rate. Thf· Comrni.o.:.o.:inn
then hy it:- finding X o. -+ reeite:- a~ follow:-:
"-l. Beun1sr rJ.t the 1·r1rir·fif M ;;ick;1p (!iirl fr rm i 11ntio11 sites a 11 d f711, i Ii c r r n .>. e d r7 em rrn r7 111i tlu
puldic _trn- 11011-rp.•.;fricf Pd flexil1fr· ..:.c;Tic1·. pr1i11f f1)
poi 11 t 0 1/ tl1 0rif1;. 0 r out ho r it y frJ d rs ig 11 at r rl o /"!' 0 ,

and return are no lo11gn practical. This lzas bren
11·cl1 illustrated i11 recent lzfari11gs l1etr)rP the Crl/nmi.•:sion. Tlze protestant, Jfitchcll H'illiams. 1ra,
.irJ,.11Pd ln; SPreral carriPrs i11 o recrnt proceerli11rt
i11rohi11g seural cases to form a sohd front /11
support of thP propositi.011 ·that all carrier.i: 11el'd
.flcxi7Ac authority in order to ."'rdist11 t711' needs ot
(1 dcma11di11g public.
Some 0.f the corrier.<:: supporting this co11te11tio11 zrcrP .James E. H1111t and
Emery R. H1111t. doing l1usi11fss as Canyon Co1111try Scc11ic Tours: Eugene D. Fo11slu:e, doing l111si11 e.~"" as To 11rs o.f the Big Co u 11 try: Canyon Cl' rs.
Inc.; a11d Lake Pozcell Ferry Sen-ice. The 1111iform positio11 taken by all of these carrier ..:. inrficates a puulic nePd for more .flexibility in respect
to points of pick11p and discharge. a11d sen-ice i11
co111lJi11atio11 zcith other type tours.·· (Emphasi:'
added)
It is clear from a reading of the entire report and order
that the Commission has made findings on basic facts
which show that the public eoffn.•nience and necessity
required amendment of the Frosts' certificate so that
the Frosts ·would have the priYilege theretoforr grantPd
to other similar carriers to ser\e the needs of their
clientele within the geographic areas in which they werl.:'
previously authorized to se1Te.
It appears to counsel for the Frosts that the finding:of the Commission amply support the determination that
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th1· versatility permitted by the elimination of the pickup

and discharge restrictions was "reasonably necessary to
aecommodate" both present need and also a future need
.. r<'ason bly to be anticipated."
It is difficult to understand why or how the amendment of the Frosts' certificate adversely affects either
thr Parks company or -Williams. Counsel for the Parks
eompany acknowledges on page 3 of his brief that his
elient:

''Does not operate any charter or sightseeing
service off the main highways, or to any so-called
'wilderness areas' off the main highways, and does
not operate any 'jeep~type' or four-wheel drive
equipment such as might be necessary for operatiom; in wilderness areas off the main highways."
The certificate issued to the Frosts provides in part:
(R. 191)

"Applicant shall use the main highways only insofar as it is necessary to reach the natural scenic
attractions and wilderness areas above specified
·which are off main highways. Applicant in ren<.kring the sHvices hereby authorized shall use
vehicles appropriately equipped and suitable for
serving the authorized scenic areas and shall in
no ease furnish transportation serviee from point
to point along the main highways."

Tt is thus apparent that the Frosts and the Parks compan~- are engaged in a different type of service.
\Villiams has been an advocate for the very policy
which motivated the Commission in the ease at bar. On
tlw same basic evidence the Commission found in the
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"Williams case that wilderness tour operato.rs are unablP
to meet the "convenience and need of the public desiring
to use [their] services'' with such restrictions in their
certificate and that
" ... the r(>Rtrictions frustrate the ability of applicant and others [tour opera to.rs] to adequately
and properly promote and develop the tourist
trade and create an unrealistic situation which
unduly burdens the operator in his ability to provide a complete service to the public."
(See paragraph 6 of Report and Order in the Matter of
the Application of Mitchell M. Williams dba Tag-A-Long
Tours. R. 160.)
.Mitchell in protesting the application of the Frosts
now speaks out of the other side of his mouth by arguing
that public convenience and necessity does not in effect
require the elimination of pickup and delivery restrictions from the Frosts' certificate so that they may adequately serve their own clientele.
The decision to grant the Frosts authority to serve
m their authorized geographical area without onerous
pickup and discharge restrictions actually involves the
determination of a matter of policy. Our Supreme Court
in Mulcahy et al vs. Public Service Commission et al,
supra dealt with a similar question in determining whether a new or different transportation system should be
rendered by existing carriers or by the new applicant.
On review this court said: (101 Utah 245, 261)
"Should such new service be rendered by existing
carriers or by the new applicant? This question
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poses for the Commission, not the finding of a
factual answer, but the determination of a matter
of policy.''
ln the case at bar the decision to remove restrictions
which limit the ability of the wilderness tour operator
to serve his clientele and to promote a new type of service
(the combination type tour) is a matter of policy which
is within the exclusive province of the Public Service
Commission.

In Salt Lake and Utah Corporation vs. Pitblic Serv-

tcc C01nmission, 106 Utah 403, 149 P.2d 647, a motor
carrier urged that it should be granted the authority to
make its service adequate before the certificate of a
competitor be amended to extend the operation of the
latter into additional territory. The court on review held
that the decision in such a case rested entirely within
the discretion of the Commission and particularly so
if the protesting carrier furnished no evidence that additional competition would so impair its revenues as to
prevent it from adequately serving the public.
Thtn-e is no dispute in the evidence with respect to
the highly personal nature of the business of each wilderness tour operator nor is there any evidence whatever
that the enlargement of the Frosts certificate would
impair the revenues of the protestants.
Both vVilliams and the Parks company place considerable emphasis upon their contention that the public
need is fulfilled by existing carriers. This argument
overlo-0ks the fact that the need in this type of service
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is created by the earner itself, and also that the testimony in this case shows a present need of Frosts' clie11tclc for the new type service. Appropo of this point is
the following quotation from Mitlcahy et al i:s. Public
Scn:ice Commission et al (101 Utah 2-15, 252-253)
'·And if a new or enlarged service will enhanee
the public welfart>, increase its oppo.rtunitiPs, or
stimulate its economie, social, intellectual or spiritual lifr to the extent that the patronage receiVt'd will justify the expense of rendering it, tlw
old service is not adequate."
Furthermore, where the service applied for is mf'rely
auxiliary to that already authorized, the qut>stion of
adequacy of existing facilities is not material. Chesapeake & O.R. Co. i:s. Publfr Service Commission. 81 SE
2d 700 ('V. Ya. 1953).
Finally, petitioners place considerable reliance upon
their contention that the testimony of Kent Frost is
hearsay. This contention is answered in the ease of
Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines vs. TVelling, 9 U.2d 11-t,
339 P.2d 1011 where the Supreme Court held that an
experienced operator was competent to give his appraisal of the need for the service which he proposed;
that such testimony was a reflection of knowledge gained
in the activity of the witness in carrying on his carrier's
services; and that the testimony was not hearsay and
was sufficient to provide a basis for the finding of a
public need for the service.
The petitioners in this case have failed to make a
showing sufficient to overcome the presumptions of reg-
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ularity. The Commission in revie,,·ing the evidence befon• it and taking into consideration its special knowledge
of the transportation industry has S(~en fit to grant to
tlw Frosts (who have been in business much longer than
\Villiarns) the same anthority previously granted to 'Villiams, so that each could adequately serve their own
dientele. In doing so, it has not invaded the provmce
of Pither vVilliams 01' the Parks Company.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the order of the Commission is
within its jurisdietion; is founded upon a sound legal
and evidt>ntiary basis, and is not arbitrary or capricious.
The order should be affirnwd.

Respectfully suhmitted,

VAN COT11, BAGLEY,
CORN"' ALL & )lcCARTHY
Grant )lacfarlane, Jr.
Thomas )[. Burton

